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Abstract 
This paper extends a general equilibrium model of unemployment and working 
hours and evaluates the model on a 5 percent working time reduction for shift 
workers in Sweden. Panel data from firms’ payroll records are used to examine 
the relationship between standard hours, actual hours and hourly wages. The 
main results are: i) Actual hours only decreased by 40 percent of the reduction 
in standard hours. ii) Hourly wages for shift workers rose relative to wages for 
daytime workers. iii) The wage increase was more pronounced for workers 
who received a larger reduction of actual hours. The conclusion is that working 
time reductions that allow for discretion on lower levels of bargaining do not 
necessarily reduce actual hours. Furthermore, working time reductions may re-
sult in an increase in wage pressure, causing unemployment to rise. 
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1  Introduction 
Unemployment in the European Union is considered too high by most observ-
ers. At the same time, an increasing number of workers wish to work fewer 
hours (OECD 1998). This has lead unions and policymakers in several Euro-
pean countries to push for working time reductions. Partly, this has been moti-
vated as a policy for reducing unemployment, “work sharing”. The assumption 
behind this proposal is that a fixed number of working hours is demanded in 
the economy, and that more workers could find employment if hours per 
worker are reduced. Theoretical and empirical work by economists have lent 
little support to this idea. The main theoretical objection has been that total de-
mand for labour services will be reduced due to substitution from labour to 
capital and reduced production (a recent survey is Kapteyn et al, 2000).  
This paper will take as a starting point an equilibrium model of the labour 
market that accounts for the stylised fact that unemployment is independent of 
the state of technology. The model shows that a general working time reduction 
will tend to lower wage pressure and equilibrium unemployment due to a re-
duction in the cost of forgone leisure when working. This will be the only ef-
fect on equilibrium unemployment if the employment elasticity with respect to 
(hourly) wages is independent of the length of the workweek. A counteracting 
effect is derived if firms have fixed costs of employment. A shorter workweek 
will increase the importance of fixed costs, causing the wage pressure and the 
unemployment rate to rise. Thus, the paper shows that the net effect of a work-
ing time reduction on unemployment is ambiguous. Furthermore, it is argued 
that it is possible to evaluate the effect on the wage pressure by studying the re-
sponses of actual hours and hourly wages to a partial reduction  in standard 
working time.  
The empirical part of the paper studies a 5 % reduction in standard working 
hours, as defined in central agreements, for one class of shift workers in the 
Swedish manufacturing and mining industries. The results show that actual 
working hours were reduced by only 40 % of the reduction in standard hours. 
Evidence suggests that one reason for the small effect is that only some work-
ers had their actual hours reduced. Hourly wages were increased as a result of 
the reduction in standard hours. The rise in hourly wages was sufficient to 
leave relative monthly earnings constant. Relative wages rose for all workers 
covered by the standard hours’ reduction, but the rise was most pronounced for 
the workers that had their actual hours reduced. This suggests that wage pres-IFAU – The effects of working time reductions   4
sure increased as a result of the reduction in standard hours and that unem-
ployment may increase as well if standard hours are reduced for all workers.  
The major part of the theoretical literature on working hours’ regulations 
was published in the 1980:s when work sharing was frequently discussed as a 
labour market policy in continental Europe. Examples of models studying the 
effect of a working time reduction on labour demand are Hart (1987) and pa-
pers by Calmfors and Hoel (1988 and 1989) that deal with shift work and over-
time. Booth and Ravallion (1993) studies the importance of fixed costs for the 
partial equilibrium effects on labour demand of a working time reduction. For a 
survey of bargaining models for working time, see Earl and Pencavel (1990). 
Theoretical studies of the effect of working time reductions on equilibrium un-
employment are less common; exceptions are Houpis (1993) and Marimon and 
Zilibotti (2000). 
Empirical work on Swedish data includes Pencavel and Holmlund (1988) 
that studies industry level relationships between labour demand, hours and 
wages. Jacobson and Ohlsson (2000) study aggregate time series data and find 
an effect from legislated working time on actual hours, but also that employ-
ment and working hours are unrelated. Very little empirical work has been 
done on micro level data; for an international review see Hunt (1998). Exam-
ples are Crépon and Kramarz (2000) that study the effects on employment of 
the French 1982 working time reduction and Hunt (1999) that studies the ef-
fects of an industry level working time reduction on hours, wages, and em-
ployment in Germany. Hunt finds that hours were reduced by almost the pre-
dicted amount, that hourly wages rose to compensate for the loss in earnings 
and consequently, that employment fell.  
This paper adds to the empirical literature in two aspects. First, it supple-
ments Hunt (1999) in giving additional micro-evidence of the effect on actual 
hours and hourly wages from a partial working time reduction. This paper uses 
population-wide administrative data on working hours and wages from firms’ 
payroll records while Hunt mainly used survey data and self reported standard 
hours. Second, it gives evidence on how a central working time reduction is 
implemented in an environment where it is possible to renegotiate agreements 
on a local level (see Anxo and O’Reilly 2000).  
The paper is structured as follows:  Section 2  discusses predictions from 
equilibrium theory for the effects of a working time reduction on unemploy-
ment and what we may learn about these effects from partial working time re-
ductions. Section 3 describes the experiment and the data used in the empirical IFAU – The effects of working time reductions  5
section of this paper. Section 4 presents evidence of the effect on actual hours 
worked and Section 5 presents evidence on hourly wages. Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2  Theory 
The simple work sharing argument rests on the assumption that there is a fixed 
number of working hours demanded in the economy. The demand for labour 
services may however change with hours worked for several reasons, such as 
substitution of inputs from labour to capital, changes in total output, and skill 
match problems. A large part of the literature on work sharing has discussed 
the importance of these effects in an attempt to determine whether labour de-
mand will increase or decrease as the result of a working time reduction.  
Labour demand effects are important for workers in a single firm consider-
ing the effects of a shorter workweek. They are also of interest for the welfare 
implications of a general working time reduction. However, they will not be of 
prime interest for a study of how equilibrium unemployment responds to a 
working time reduction, i.e. to an evaluation of work sharing as a policy. The 
reason is that changes in labour demand from a working time reduction should 
not affect equilibrium unemployment for the same reason that expansions in 
product demand, or increases in productivity due to technological change,
1 
does not affect equilibrium unemployment. Increases in labour demand that re-
duce short run unemployment will simply result in increased wages until un-
employment has returned to its initial equilibrium value.
2  
Changes in the length of the workweek may have an effect on equilibrium 
unemployment through the wage setting process, however. Equilibrium unem-
ployment will be affected if wage demands at a given unemployment level 
changes due to the working time reduction. There are (at least) two reasons to 
believe that the wage pressure will be affected by a working time reduction. 
Houpis’ (1993) equilibrium model of unemployment implies that a working 
time reduction will decrease wage pressure and unemployment since the cost 
of forgone leisure from working is smaller if the workweek is shorter. On the 
                                                 
1 Note that there is an important correspondence between a working time reduction and technical 
change. The direct effect of a working time reduction is decreased production per employee 
whereas technical change increases production per employee. 
2 See Layard et al (1991) for a further discussion of this point. IFAU – The effects of working time reductions   6
other hand, fixed costs per employee (e.g. search
3 or hiring costs) that are not 
related to hours of work may become more important if the workweek is short-
ened. This will reduce the wage sensitivity of employment and thus lead to an 
increase in wage pressure and equilibrium unemployment. 
The model presented in the following sections follow Houpis (1993), both 
in structure and in allowing for effects through the value of leisure. The contri-
butions are twofold: First, the choice of functional forms generates an unem-
ployment rate that is independent of technical change and thus, removes all 
short run effects through shifts in labour demand. Second, the model allows for 
equilibrium effects of firms’ fixed costs of employment. It is shown that the net 
effect on unemployment from a working time reduction depends on the relative 
importance of firms’ fixed costs and workers’ value of leisure. The sign of the 
net effect is in general indeterminate. Furthermore, it is shown that the response 
of hourly wages to a partial working time reduction will contain evidence on 
whether the wage pressure, and thus the equilibrium unemployment rate, will 
decrease or not from a general working time reduction. 
 
2.1  The model  
For simplicity it is assumed that the unions unilaterally set hourly straight-time 
wages (w ~ ).
4 Given these wages firms set employment (N) to maximise profits. 
Actual hours (h) are assumed to be equal to, or greater than, standard hours 
(hs). An overtime premium ( w p~ ) is paid for each overtime hour. Hence, we 
may define average hourly earnings (w) as  
 
       
h
h h p h
w w
s s ) )( 1 ( ~ - + +
”       (1) 
 
Actual hours are assumed to be a function of standard hours, but independ-
ent of wages,  ) ( s h h Y = . This assumption is convenient since it allows us to 
conduct the analysis in terms of actual hours (h) and hourly earnings (w) first, 
and later proceed to study the exact relationship between standard and actual 
hours. One obvious special case is when we do not allow for overtime and ac-
                                                 
3 See Pissarides (2000), ch. 7. 
4 Bargaining over wages in a “right to manage” framework will not change the main results. IFAU – The effects of working time reductions  7
tual hours are equal to standard hours. Some further justifications for the as-
sumption that hours are independent of wages are presented in Section 2.3.  
Denote employment by N, hours by h, and the state of technology by A; and 
assume that the production function is Cobb-Douglas, ( )
a b Nh A , with decreas-
ing marginal productivity of labour  ( ) 1 < a . Marginal productivity may be de-
creasing more rapidly if hours are increased than if employment is increased, 
implying b < 1.
5 Costs are equal to wage costs (whN) plus a fixed cost per em-
ployee (AcN). The fixed cost is assumed to be proportional to the technology 
parameter (A) to ensure that the unemployment rate is independent of techno-
logical progress.
6 Thus, the problem for firm i is:  
 
      ( ) i i i i
N AcN hN w h N A
i
- - =
a b p max .       
 
The first order condition for a maximum is: 
 
      ( ) [ ] a ab a - - + = 1
1
1 * A h Ac h w N i i  .        (2) 
 
Differentiate to get the elasticity of employment with respect to hourly wages: 
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Wages in each firm are set by a monopoly union (with fixed membership 
M), trading off the benefits of higher wages against the risk of reduced em-
ployment. The union’s objective is the maximisation of a representative mem-
ber’s utility. For the unemployment rate to be independent of the state of tech-
nology it is necessary that the utility function is isoelastic in earnings.
7 The util-
                                                 
5 The rate of decline in the marginal productivity of hours will not be important for the qualita-
tive results of the analysis. For a more elaborated analysis of the importance of hourly productiv-
ity in a partial equilibrium monopoly union model, see Booth and Ravallion (1993). 
6 Holmlund (2000) presents a motivation for why “vacancy costs” should be indexed to the state 
of technology, but not to hours. 
7 Assuming that the value of leisure is the value of home production and that home productivity 
is proportional to market productivity will allow for a wider class of utility functions. Such an as-
sumption may remove the leisure effect derived here.  IFAU – The effects of working time reductions   8
ity of leisure is some general function f(T-h) ( with f'>0 and f''<0) of the total 
time endowment (T) minus working hours. The unions objective is to maximise 
the weighted average of the utility for the employed,  ) (
) (
h T
h wi - f
s
s
, and the 
expected utility for workers loosing their jobs, 
u V , where the outside option is 
taken to be exogenous during wage setting.  
 
 
Thus, union i will solve the problem: 
 
   







u i i i
w
















- = W f
s
s
,    (4) 
 
and the first order condition is:
8  
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The first order condition (5) is the partial equilibrium wage equation that, 
together with the equation for the employment elasticity (3), will determine the 
wage level at a particular firm. To get equilibrium unemployment we need to 
endogenously determine the utility of unemployed union members. To this end, 
we assume that all firms and unions are identical and drop the index i. Assume 
further, in accordance with standard assumptions, that the outside option is the 
weighted average of the utility of the employed and the unemployed with the 
probability of the respective states given by the unemployment rate (u). Unem-
ployment benefits are assumed to be indexed to the average income in the 
economy, the replacement ratio being denoted by b. This gives the outside op-
tion: 
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8 This requires that the employment elasticity (eNw) is larger than s . IFAU – The effects of working time reductions  9
 
Rewriting (5) under this assumption and solving for unemployment gives:  
 
























f s is the “effective” replacement rate, i.e. the replace-
ment rate adjusted to take account of the relative leisure cost of working. From 
(7) we see that we may have two effects on equilibrium unemployment, one 
through the employment elasticity and one through changes in the effective re-
placement ratio. 
  
2.1.1  Case 1: No fixed costs 
We know from the firms profit maximisation problem and equation (3) that the 
employment elasticity is a constant in the case with no fixed costs (i.e. when c 
= 0). Differentiating (7) under this assumption, and noting that  1 ) (
~
< h b  (or all 
workers would prefer to be unemployed), we see that unemployment is increas-
ing in working hours: 
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Hence, a working time reduction will lower the unemployment rate. This is the 
prediction of Houpis (1993) restated using the most general explicit utility 
function that is consistent with the stylised fact that unemployment is inde-
pendent of the state of technology. This independence of technology has two 
important implications. The first is that the positive relationship between hours 
and unemployment is unambiguous. The second implication is that all effects 
on equilibrium unemployment come through the wage setting process. Shifts in 
the labour demand equation will not affect the unemployment level.
9 This is 
important for the study of the partial working time reduction. A shorter work-
week will result in reduced earnings for both employed and unemployed work-
                                                 
9 Note that the parameter for the productivity of hours (b) does not enter equation (8).  IFAU – The effects of working time reductions   10
ers, but this will not affect equilibrium unemployment due to the independence 
of the state of technology (causing independence of the earnings level). The ef-
fect on unemployment from a working time reduction is due to the fact that the 
shorter the workweek is; the lower is the cost of forgone leisure when working 
and thus the effective replacement ratio  ) (
~
h b . 
 
2.1.2  Case 2: Fixed costs 
In the analysis above, and in the equilibrium analysis in Houpis (1993), it is as-
sumed that the elasticity of employment with respect to wages is independent 
of working hours. This assumption is violated if there are fixed costs of em-
ployment.
10 Normalise the (constant) number of firms and the size of the (con-
stant) labour force to 1, implying  ) 1 ( u N - = . Use these normalisations to 
transform the firms first order condition (2) into a function of the unemploy-
ment rate and use (3) to get  
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Thus, the elasticity of employment is independent of the state of technology, 
but not independent of working hours if there are fixed costs of employment. 
Furthermore, it is positively related to both the unemployment rate and to 
working hours. Thus, there is an offsetting effect on unemployment. Fixed 
costs will be of increased importance when working time is reduced, resulting 
in a less sensitive employment elasticity, higher wage pressure and conse-
quently; higher unemployment. The net effect on unemployment is found by 
differentiating (7), using (9): 
 
                                                 
















timum where p = F(N)-C(N,w) is the maximand of the firm; F is the production function, C is to-
tal costs and the subscripts denote derivatives. The fixed cost argument is used here since it has a 
clear economic interpretation, but other similar arguments could easily be made.  IFAU – The effects of working time reductions  11
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The sign of the net effect on unemployment is indeterminate. The larger the 
proportion of fixed cost and the less decreasing the marginal product of hours 
are, the more likely it is that unemployment will increase if hours are reduced.  
This simple model has shown that a working time reduction can affect un-
employment even if unemployment is independent of the state of technology. 
Furthermore, we see that the sign of the effect on unemployment in general is 
indeterminate. It depends on whether wage pressure is increased (i.e. the fixed 
cost effect dominates) or decreased (i.e. the leisure effect dominates).  
 
2.2  Interpreting evidence from a partial working time reduc-
tion 
A partial working time reduction will by definition only affect a limited num-
ber of workers and it is reasonable to assume that the outside option (V
u) is in-
dependent of the reduction. This implies that a shortening of the workweek for 
a few workers should result in lower wages, not lower unemployment, if the ef-
fect on the utility of working dominates the effect on the employment elastic-
ity.  
Restating the partial equilibrium wage equation (5) for convenience: 
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Differentiating (11) using (3) and solving for the elasticity of wages with re-
spect to hours: 
 



















        (12) 
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The net effect on wages from a working time reduction is ambiguous according 
to (12) since Q is positive. A shorter workweek will improve the welfare of the 
workers causing wage restraint, but it will also increase the importance of fixed 
costs, causing increased wage demands.  
In the absence of fixed costs the right hand side of (11) is a constant imply-
ing Q = 0. Thus, if individual workers desire a shorter workweek (12) will be 
positive and we should observe hourly wages falling as the result of a working 
time reduction.
11 This is, once again, the prediction in Houpis (1993) restated 
using the utility function needed for an unemployment level that is independent 
of the state of technology.  
Only if there are fixed costs affecting the wage setting and if workers are 
sufficiently close to optimum will we observe hourly wages rising as a result of 
a working time reduction. There is some evidence that workers in general pre-
fer to work fewer hours, survey data from 1998 suggest that Swedish full time 
workers on average preferred to work 6.8 hours less per week (Torp and Barth 
2001). This implies that we can interpret a rise in hourly wages in the response 
to a partial working time reduction as a rise in wage pressure resulting from the 
presence of fixed costs. It can also be noted that these results are independent 
the state of technology effects (i.e. of the value of b). 
 
2.3  The determination of actual hours  
The model is based on the assumption that actual working time is independent 
of the wage setting and employment decisions. This assumption is clearly valid 
if actual hours always equal standard hours. The model does, however, allow 
for actual hours to be determined endogenously through the use of overtime as 
long as overtime is determined separately from wages. If overtime is used, ac-
tual hours (h) and hourly earnings (w) (defined by equation 1) will be the rele-
vant variables instead of the hourly straight-time wages  ) ~ (w and standard hours 
(hs). Some special cases motivating that actual hours may be independent of 
wages, even if overtime is used, is presented below. It will in all cases be as-
sumed that actual hours are equal to, or greater than, standard hours. 
                                                 











s e , and the second 
order condition ensures that  0 < vh e  if the workweek is longer than optimal.  IFAU – The effects of working time reductions  13
A standard result in the work sharing literature is that actual hours may in-
crease when standard hours are reduced if firms determine hours and the over-
time premium is linear ( w p~ ). Following Houpis (1993) we can show this result 
by assuming that firms use a positive amount of overtime due to the existence 
of a fixed wage cost (qw ~ ) per worker. The assumption that this cost is propor-
tional to wages has the effect that the employment elasticity with respect to 
wages remains constant if standard hours are changed. The firm maximises 
profits by choosing hours and employment: 
 
        ( ) N w q whN Nh A
h N
~ max
, - - =
a b p .    (13) 
 
For a non-trivial solution, assume that firms use a positive amount of over-
time (i.e.  s h h >
* ). The first order conditions give  
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Thus, actual hours will increase if standard hours are reduced.
12 It can be noted 
that the effect on actual hours may differ between firms due to heterogeneity in 
the parameters q and b. These parameters do not enter the wage equation (11), 
and the wage does not enter equation (14). Thus, we may view a larger reduc-
tion in actual hours (due to lower q or b) as a larger exogenous reduction in 
hours that should lead to a larger reduction in earnings if c = 0.  
An alternative case is when individuals choose their own overtime. Assum-
ing once again a constant overtime premium ( w p~ ) and using the utility func-
tion from above (assuming for simplicity  ( )
ls f h T - = ) gives a first order con-
dition for an interior solution (i.e. with positive overtime):  
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12 If hours and wages are bargained over individually, as in the case of a search model, the pre-
diction is that hours (and earnings) are independent of standard hours (Marimon and Zilibotti 
2000). IFAU – The effects of working time reductions   14
Thus, there is a positive relationship between standard hours and actual hours. 
It should be noted that this case assumes that workers always are in their indi-
vidual optimum for hours and that this implies that hourly earnings should be 
unaffected by changes in standard hours unless there are fixed costs (from 
equation 12). 
It is the change in actual hours that will determine the effect on the wage 
pressure as long as actual hours are independent of earnings. Hence the empiri-
cal part of the paper (Section 4 and Section 5) will study not only the response 
of wages to a working time reduction but also the response of actual hours, and 
the interactions between those effects. Actual hours are independent of the 
wage level in both of the solutions above. This is a convenient result that does 
not survive if firms choose actual hours and a true fixed cost (AcN) is included 
as in Section 2.1 and Section 2.2. In that case, actual hours will be a function of 
wages, causing the solution to be complicated beyond the scope of this paper.  
 
2.4  Summary 
The model presented above gives a highly stylised picture of the labour market. 
The main purpose of the model is to highlight the fundamental idea that there 
might be effects on equilibrium unemployment from changes in standard hours 
and that these should work through the wage setting process. If the result of a 
partial working time reduction is  lower hourly wages; we expect a general 
working time reduction to result in a lower overall wage level at a given unem-
ployment level, and thus, a lower equilibrium unemployment rate. On the other 
hand, if we observe a rise in hourly wages from a partial working time reduc-
tion it suggests the presence of fixed costs that may cause the equilibrium un-
employment level to increase as the result of a working time reduction. Hence, 
the response of hourly wages to a partial working time reduction will give evi-
dence on the effect on unemployment from a general reduction in working 
time. Figure 1 show the basic structure of the analysis. The direct effects of a 
partial reduction in standard hours on actual hours and wages, as well as differ-
ences in the wage effects between workers with different effects on hours will 
be studied. The results will be interpreted in the theoretical framework as to 
give predictions of what effects on equilibrium unemployment we would ex-
pect from a general working time reduction. 










3  The working time reduction 
All Swedish blue-collar workers are categorised in one of 5 different shift form 
categories; daytime, 2-shift, discontinuous 3-shift, continuous 3-shift, and u n-
derground (mining etc.).
13 Anxo and Sterner (1995) provide a description of the 
use of shift work in Sweden from 1968 to 1990. Figure 2 shows the develop-
ment over time of standard working hours, as determined in central agree-
ments, for the different shift forms. Between 1983 and 1988 there was a grad-
ual reduction in standard working time for 2-shift workers from 40 to 38 hours 
per week. The reduction was the result of a series of central agreements b e-
tween the Swedish Employers Confederation (SAF) and the Swedish  Trade 
Union Confederation (LO).
14 These agreements were implemented at the indus-
try level either as a reduction of working hours on a weekly basis or with i n-
creased time off.
15 The intention was to keep monthly wages constant relative 
to wages for other workers. 
                                                 
13 2-shift workers alternate between morning and afternoon shifts on a weekly basis. 
Discontinuous 3-shift workers alternate between morning, afternoon and night shifts. 
Continuos 3-shift workers are, in addition to working morning, afternoon and night shifts during 
the workweek, also working weekends. 
14 LO (1988). 
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Figure 2. Standard hours by shift form 1981-1992 
 
 
This paper will study how the actual working time and hourly wages for 2-
shift workers changed during this time compared to hours and wages for other 
workers.  
 
3.1  Data 
The study will use individual level panel data collected from private sector 
firms by the Swedish Employers Confederation (SAF). Data covers earnings 
and working hours for the second quarter each year on all privately employed 
workers covered by the central agreements in Sweden. The paper will use data 
for blue-collar workers from 1981 to 1992. The motivation for this time frame 
is a labour market conflict in the second quarter of 1980 and a change in the 
data collection procedure in 1993. In total, the data set consists of on average 
400,000 observations per year. It has not been widely used for microeconomic 
research in the past
16 but it has been used frequently in aggregate form as the 
base of Statistics Sweden’s aggregate data set on working hours and wages. 
The data should be accurate except for black market (tax evasive) work. It 
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should also be noted that the measure of actual hours used in this paper refer to 
paid hours, unpaid hours are not recorded.  
The working time data and the wage data are decomposed into several parts, 
such as straight-time hours (wages), overtime hours (-premium), shift compen-
sation, etc. The data set further contains information on industry
17 and munici-
pality as well as size of the firm and the workplace. The firm can however not 
be identified. Individuals can be followed over time but individual characteris-
tics are not recorded except for age and gender. Standard hours from central 
agreements are assigned to the observations according to their shift form. See 
Appendix A for further details about the data set, descriptive statistics and ap-
plied sample restrictions. 
 
3.2  Identification of the treatment group 
SAF did not register 2-shift workers separately from daytime workers before 
1988 (i.e. before the final year of the working time reduction). Standard hours 
can be assigned for the years 1981-82 when standard hours where equal to 40 
for both daytime and 2-shift workers, and during 1988-92. These years can be 
used to identify the effect of the working time reduction if actual hours and 
wages did not differ between daytime and 2-shift workers before the reduction, 
or if the shift form status were constant for individuals over time (see further 
Section 4.1 below). The identification will, however, be problematic if there 
were substantial differences between shift-forms before the reduction and 
workers did change their shift forms. 
The solution will be to use a proxy for workers’ shift form. This proxy will 
be constructed using the fraction of shift compensation to total earnings. 
Henceforth this fraction will be referred to as the  shift compensation  share 
(SCS). This variable, unfortunately, also includes daytime workers unsociable 
hours’ premium, resulting in measurement errors in the proxy. The period after 
1987, for which the true shift-form definition is available, will be used to 
evaluate the extent of measurement errors. For a more detailed discussion on 
the identification, see Appendix B. The incidence of 2-shift work is much larger 
in manufacturing and mining than in other sectors. In the other sectors it is 
more common that daytime workers have shift compensation without formally 
                                                 
17 The industry classification used refers to union contracts.  IFAU – The effects of working time reductions   18
being 2-shift workers. Thus, this study will focus on manufacturing and mining 
to minimise the problems with measurement errors.  
In addition to standard hours, scheduled weekly hours will be used to study 
how the implementation varies between 2-shift workers. This variable contains 
the number of hours that a firm reported that the individual worked during a 
normal workweek. It was not mandatory for firms to report scheduled hours, 
the response rate was 55 % (see Table A2, Appendix A). The data do not indi-
cate that workers with reported standard hours differ from workers with miss-
ing values. Both the direct effects of the agreements on actual hours and wages 
(the “intention to treat” effect), and the effects on hours and wages for workers 
that changed their scheduled hours as a result of the agreement (the local aver-
age treatment effect, LATE) will be studied.
18 Table 1 describes the three main 
variables of interest; standard hours, scheduled weekly hours (for the actual re-
duction) and the 2-shift dummy for the initial difference between shift forms.  
 
3.3  Empirical strategy 
One possible strategy would be to estimate an equation for actual hours and 
simply include standard hours as a regressor. This might, however, confuse the 
effect of a change in standard hours with systematic differences in actual hours 
between shift forms since the only variations in standard hours, except for the 
reduction for 2 -shift workers, are permanent differences between shift forms. 
This paper is primarily focusing on the effect of a change in standard hours and 
less interested in the permanent differences that may exist between different 
shift forms. In order to get a clear-cut experiment the paper will only use the in-
formation from the years before the reduction (1981-1982) and compare them 
with the years after the reduction (1989-1992). There are several reasons for 
this: One reason is that standard hours would have to be assigned using the 
proxy for the years 1983-1987. Another reason is that it is difficult to assign the 
standard hours for some years when the central agreements take effect in the 
middle of the second quarter of the year, which is the period when the data is 
collected.
19 One advantage of the approach is that the relatively long period be-
tween the years before and after the reduction should reduce the influence of 
                                                 
18 See Imbens and Angrist (1994) for a further description of LATE.  
19 Estimates (not reported) where all years have been used in regressions with both lagged and 
current standard hours show that the sum of the estimates on current and lagged standard hours is 
approximately equal to the estimates presented in the paper.   IFAU – The effects of working time reductions  19
transitionary dynamics on the results. It is an advantage not having to worry 
about short run issues, such as nominal wage rigidities, since the focus of this 
paper is on the long run effects of working time reductions  
 
Table 1. Main variables of interest 
Variable  Effect  Source  Comments 
Standard hours 
The direct effect of the 
agreement (“Intention 
to treat effect”) 
Shift form code and 
central agreements  
Daytime and 2-shift 
workers mixed before 
1988. Standard hours 
were 40 for both groups 
before 1983. 
Scheduled hours 
The effect on com-
pliers (“Local average 
treatment effect”) 
Scheduled hours as 
reported 
Non-compulsory ques-







Measurement errors due 
to false positives and 




4  Evidence on actual hours 
All workers do not work full time; furthermore, people switch jobs, take sick 
leaves and vacations and are absent from work for other reasons such as labour 
market conflicts. A large portion (about 50 % of the sample, see Appendix A) of 
the workers also work overtime. This results in a distribution of actual hours 
that exhibits substantial variation. Figure 3 describes the distribution of actual 











Figure 3. Hours worked in the 2
nd quarter in 1982 and 1990 
 
Given that the data cover hours and wages during a quarter each year it is 
not, in general, possible to separate the differences in total hours that are due to 
variations in weekly hours from variations in the number of days worked. All 
workers should in principle be equally affected by the reform (in percentages) 
if the lower tail in the distribution of actual hours comes from the use of short-
term contracts (e.g. seasonal work) labour market churning or worker absentee-
ism. But changes in the number of days worked that are (possibly spuriously) 
correlated with shift forms may have a very large impact on the estimates. This 
motivates the rather restrictive trimming of the sample used. Only workers with 
more than 320 non-overtime hours (approximately 8 weeks) during the quarter 
are included in the sample.  
  
4.1  Effects on actual hours for 2-shift workers 
The purpose of this section is to investigate how total actual (paid) hours 
changed for the average 2-shift worker when standard hours were reduced, i.e. 
the “intention-to-treat-effect”. Given available data, it is possible to identify the 
effect without using a proxy under some partially testable assumptions. Let 
i a indicate an individual fixed effect. The parameter 1 b denotes the initial dif-
ference in working time between 2 -shift workers and daytime workers and 
g denotes the effect of the change in (the log of) standard hours (
s h ).
20 Denot-
ing the other covariates by X and disregarding the error term, we may write the 
log of the working time (h) as: 
                                                 
20 The choice of a logarithmic specification is due to the fact that workers who work different 
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Subtracting individual means (denoted by bars) to remove the individual spe-
cific effects: 
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The effect of the reduction, captured by  g , is the change in working time 
for 2-shift workers relative to daytime workers. The initial difference in work-
ing hours, 1 b , can not be estimated without using the shift form proxy (see Sec-
tion 3.2 and Appendix B). We can only identify the effect without using the 
proxy if one of the following two conditions holds: 
 
1)  0 1 = b  
 




it ,     
2 2 " =
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Condition 1) states that there are no differences in working time between 
shift forms that are independent of standard hours. This should be the case if 
working time was indeed completely determined by the central agreements. 
Condition 2) states that those who where 2 -shift workers after the reduction 
where 2-shift workers before the reduction as well. The permanent effect will 
thus be removed as a part of the individual fixed effects and the change in 
working time for these workers will be captured by  g . Under assumption 1) or 
2) we get: 




it i it i it h h X X h h - + - = - g b       (18) 
 
Since standard hours are equal to 40 hours per week for both daytime and 2-
shift workers before the reduction we may estimate equation (18) without 
knowledge of the shift forms before the reduction. 
Results are presented in the first column of Table 2 below. The first column 
presents results from a regression according to (18) that includes a third order 
age polynomial as well as year and industry interaction dummies in the X ma-IFAU – The effects of working time reductions   22
trix to control for differences in the age composition between shift forms and 
differences in time effects between industries. The result indicates that actual 
hours where reduced by only 40 % of the reduction in standard hours. The es-
timate is different from both zero and one at the one percent level of statistical 
significance. Estimates (not reported) on samples were observations with less 
than 320 actual hours were included in the regressions find somewhat smaller 
effects.  
 
Table 2. Elasticities of actual hours with respect to standard hours 
Industry and year interactions 
Control group 
Estimated  
parameter  Not controlling 








0.403  0.372  0.310  0.324 
Standard hours 
(0.020)  (0.021)  (0.020)  (0.021) 




2-shift dummy  -- 
(0.0011)  (0.0011)  (0.0010) 
0.376  0.377  0.316  3-shift  
workers  Standard hours  -- 
(0.024)  (0.021)  (0.024) 
Note: All regressions include individual specific fixed effects and an age cube. Standard errors are in paren-
theses. 
 
To estimate the effect while relaxing assumptions 1) and 2) we use the 
proxy (denoted by
2 - SCS
it D ) for whether the worker is a 2-shift worker or not. Es-
timating equation (17) directly we get estimates of both the initial difference in 
working time ( 1 b ) and the effect of the change in standard hours (g ). The re-
sults, presented in the second column of Table 2, suggest that the initial differ-
ence in working time between shift forms is small. The estimate indicate that 2-
shift workers worked 0.6 % (approximately 15 minutes per week) less than 
daytime workers before the working time reduction (note however that the 
dummy is subject to the attenuation bias discussed in Appendix B). Inclusion of 
the proxy itself does not affect the standard hours’ estimate much, the estimate 
of g  is reduced to 0.37 but the difference is not statistically significant. The IFAU – The effects of working time reductions  23
small effect on the variable of interest from including the 2-shift proxy suggests 
that the measurement error in the proxy be of little importance for the standard 
hours’ estimate since the correlation between the proxy and the true definition 
is reasonably high (see Appendix B). Nevertheless, the dummy will be included 
in all regressions in the remainder of this section.  
When trying to identify the effect of the change in standard hours on 2-shift 
workers, daytime workers are used to control for different time effects between 
industries. The underlying assumption for this identification is that actual hours 
of other workers were unaffected by the change in standard hours for 2-shift 
workers. It is, however, conceivable that other workers in firms that employ 2-
shift workers demanded a compensation for the improvements for the 2-shift 
workers. If that compensation were in the form of shorter hours for daytime 
workers as well, it would bias the estimates of the effect on hours towards zero. 
To check for this possibility, the last two columns of Table 2 show estimates of 
the effect on actual hours when the control variables are varied. The first col-
umn only controls for year dummies whereas the second column controls for 
the interaction of year, industry, municipality, size of the firm (categorised by 
nine dummies) and size of the work place (categorised by 10 dummies). We 
should see systematic differences between these models if the other workers 
were affected indirectly. We expect to see larger estimates when the effect is 
measured relative to all daytime workers (since that includes daytime workers 
in firms without 2-shift workers as well) than when measured relative to work-
ers within a small unit. The estimates show little signs of contamination – the 
hours’ estimates are reduced somewhat in both variations of the original model 
(0.31 and 0.32). Thus, it seems unlikely that contamination should be a major 
concern. 
One possible explanation for the small effect might be a positive trend in 
working hours for all shift workers. It is possible that working hours for 2-shift 
workers would have increased relative to daytime workers if there had not been 
a reduction of standard hours. By using 3-shift workers as an alternative control 
group we are able to get estimates that are insensitive to such trends. The re-
gressions from above are replicated using 3-shift workers to estimate common 
year-industry effects for all shift workers. 
The model used to compare 2 -shift workers with other shift workers i n-
cludes dummies for each shift form (2-shift, discontinuous 3-shift and continu-
ous 3 -shift), capturing constant differences in working times between shift IFAU – The effects of working time reductions   24
forms. Furthermore, the year effects (with interactions), denoted by X, will be 
estimated separately for daytime workers and (all) shift workers: 
 






it i it h X D D h e g b b a + + + + =
-
2 1     (19) 
 
The estimates should be interpreted as the change in working hours for 2-
shift workers relative to other shift workers. The results are presented in the 
bottom row of Table 2. These results do not change the impression that the ef-
fect of the working time reduction was quite modest. Estimates on total hours 
and weekly hours calculated from scheduled hours ranges from 0.32 to 0.37. 
The smallest estimate is from the model with most control variables. This could 
suggest that 3 -shift workers were a contaminated control group since 2-shift 
workers experienced a larger reduction in hours relative to the average 3-shift 
worker than relative to 3-shift workers within a smaller unit. The difference in 
estimates is however reasonably small, suggesting that this problem even if it 
exists is not of great importance. 
 
4.2  Heterogeneous effects on actual hours 
The effect of the working time reduction on actual hours is estimated to be 
quite small, regardless of comparison group. The elasticity of actual hours with 
respect to standard hours is in the interval 0.3 to 0.4. This differs substantially 
from the estimates of German working time reductions in Hunt (1999) that 
range from 0.85 to 1. One reason for this discrepancy may be that Section 4.1 
studied the direct effect of a central agreement on actual hours whereas Hunt 
(1999) studies the effect of self-reported standard hours on actual hours, di-
rectly and instrumented by standard hours from industry contracts. By using 
reported scheduled weekly hours, instrumented by standard hours, as the ex-
planatory variable we will get an idea of how the estimates in this paper relates 
to Hunt (1999). The interpretation of the IV estimates is the effect on actual 
hours for the workers that changed their weekly scheduled hours due to the 
change in standard hours, i.e. the local average treatment effect (LATE). 
The models estimated in this section are identical to the models in Section 
4.1; all regressions include year-industry dummies and an age polynomial. The 
independent variable in Table 3 is reported weekly scheduled hours. The esti-
mates of the LATE are in the order of 0.80 to 0.85. This is reasonably close to 
1 and in the range of the results in Hunt (1999). Table 3 also show estimates of 
the elasticity of actual hours with respect to scheduled hours with 3-shift work-IFAU – The effects of working time reductions  25
ers as the control group. These estimates are very close to the estimates relative 
to daytime workers.  
 
 
Table 3. Elasticities of actual hours with respect to scheduled and standard 
hours for workers with reported scheduled hours 
Relative to daytime workers  Relative to 3-shift workers 
 
Not controlling 




0.805    0.856    0.836    Scheduled hours 
(IV: standard hours)  (0.082)  (0.084)  (0.091) 
-0.0035    2-shift dummy  -- 
(0.0017) 
-- 
0.342    0.305    0.357    Standard hours (for obs. 
with reported scheduled 
hours)  (0.032)  (0.033)  (0.034) 
-0.0083    2-shift dummy  -- 
(0.0017) 
-- 
Note: All regressions include individual specific fixed effects, year and industry interaction dummies and an 
age cube. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
These results show that the workers who did see a change in their scheduled 
weekly working hours also saw a change in their actual hours without much 
substitution to overtime. The result is interesting for three reasons. First it indi-
cates that one of the reasons for why the average effect differ so radically from 
Hunts’ (1999) results for Germany may be that she studied the effect of stan-
dard hours through self-reported hours (here represented by reported scheduled 
hours). This paper focuses on the direct effect from standard hours, as defined 
in central agreements, on actual hours. Second, it is evidence of a heterogene-
ous impact of the reduction and suggests that it will be interesting to study how 
the effect on earnings differs between workers with reduced scheduled hours 
and other 2-shift workers. Third, it suggests that the main cause of the small 
average effect found above is not substitution to overtime but rather that the ac-IFAU – The effects of working time reductions   26
tual scheduled workweek remained unchanged for a large part of the workers. 
This is in line with the French experience: Crépon and Kramarz (2000) report 
that 20 % of workers did not reduce their hours. The proportion of non-
compliers seems much higher for Sweden, which may be explained by the high 
degree of flexibility in the local level implementation of agreements in Sweden 
documented by Anxo and O’Reilly (2000).  
 
 
5  Evidence on wages 
The response of hourly wages to a partial working time reduction will indicate 
whether the wage pressure has increased or decreased due to the shortening of 
the workweek. From Section 4.2 we know that the effect on actual hours was 
heterogeneous, working hours were reduced for some workers but not for oth-
ers. That leaves us with two interesting questions regarding hourly wages. Did 
average hourly wages for 2 -shift workers rise or fall? And, did the workers 
whose hours were reduced experience a fall in hourly wages relative to the 
workers whose hours remained constant?  
The purpose of the working time reduction was to reduce hours for 2-shift 
workers while keeping monthly earnings constant relative to other workers – 
implying a relative increase in hourly wages. Hence, it would be strong support 
for the idea of work sharing if hourly earnings for the average 2-shift workers 
fell relative to other workers wages as a result of the reduction. On the other 
hand, one would expect hourly earnings for the workers who experienced a re-
duction of actual hours to see fall relative to the earnings of those who did not 
receive a reduction of hours. Workers who received the working time reduction 
should see a relative reduction in hourly earnings as a premium for the reduced 
hours. It would be strong evidence against the theory of work sharing if this 
premium was not paid, since it would imply that the wage pressure was not re-
duced as a result of the working time reduction.  
Two possible wage measures can be studied, hourly earnings or the hourly 
straight-time wage (i.e. hourly earnings excluding the overtime premium). 
Hourly earnings should be the relevant variable if the interest is in actual out-
comes for wages and hours, and it is the variable used in the model in Section 
2. The hourly straight-time wage, on the other hand, is a better measure of the 
wage the worker does receive independent of his own choice of hours if he can 
choose his own overtime hours. Hunt (1999) studies the straight-time wage but IFAU – The effects of working time reductions  27
since the primary interest in this paper is on actual outcomes, the focus will be 
on hourly earnings. Hourly earnings is defined as total earnings divided by total 
hours.  
 
5.1  Effects on hourly earnings for the average 2-shift worker 
This section will study how average hourly earnings for 2 -shift workers 
changed relative to hourly earnings for other workers as a result of the reduc-
tion. The models used in this section will be similar to the models used for 
studying the effects on actual hours.  
Table 4 below shows estimates of the elasticity of hourly wages with respect 
to standard hours. The included control variables are an age-polynomial, and 
year industry interaction dummies. Negative estimates indicate that hourly 
wages rose as a result of the working time reduction. The estimate of the elas-
ticity of hourly earnings with respect to standard hours is approximately -0.5.  
The estimates of the initial difference in hourly wages, as captured by the 2-
shift proxy, show that 2-shift workers earned 10 % more than daytime workers. 
This large difference between shift forms that is independent of the reduction in 
working hours is of some concern. The problem is twofold; first the measure-
ment errors will bias the 2-shift dummy towards zero and thus give the stan-
dard hours estimate a negative bias.
21 Second, the fact that the 2-shift dummy is 
constructed from an earnings-variable may be of some concern when estimat-
ing the effect on earnings. The estimated permanent premium for 2-shift work-
ers is very close to the difference in average shift premium (0.012 for daytime 
workers and 0.095 for 2-shift workers between 1988 and 1992, see Table A2, 
Appendix A).  
 
                                                 
21 We get estimates of the effect of a standard hours reduction that are close to zero if the model 
is estimated without the 2-shift dummy. These results are not presented since they suffer from a 
serious omitted variable bias. IFAU – The effects of working time reductions   28
Table 4. Elasticities of hourly earnings with respect to standard hours 
Hourly earnings  Hourly earnings excluding shift  
premium 








-0.513    -0.355    -0.346   
Standard hours 
(0.011)  (0.011)  (0.011) 








-0.716    -0.340   3-shift  




Note: All regressions include individual specific fixed effects, year and industry interaction dummies and an 
age cube. Standard hours are in parentheses. 
 
The second and third columns of Table 4 show estimates of the effect on 
earnings where the shift compensation has been subtracted. This should reduce 
both of the problems discussed above. The estimate of the 2-shift dummy is 
now close to zero (0.002) and the standard hours’ estimates are negative and 
not affected by whether the 2-shift dummy is included or not. The standard 
hours estimates are smaller (-0.35) than when shift compensation was included 
(-0.51). This is expected since measurement errors in the 2-shift dummy should 
bias the estimate negatively in the latter case. The estimates when the shift 
compensation is excluded should be unaffected by these measurement errors 
since the 2 -shift estimate is very close to zero. Hence, the size of these esti-
mates should be closer to the true effect and the remaining part of the paper 
will focus on the effect on earnings minus shift compensation. It can be noted 
that the elasticity of –0.35 is close to the elasticity of actual hours, implying 
that monthly earnings remained largely unchanged for 2-shift workers relative 
to other workers. Thus, there are no signs of a reduced wage drift for 2-shift 
workers relative to daytime workers. The estimates for the effect on the 
straight-time wage (not reported) are generally somewhat smaller, but qualita-
tively the estimates are similar.  
The estimates showing an increase in hourly wages for 2-shift workers rela-
tive to daytime workers could be an effect of increased wages for shift workers IFAU – The effects of working time reductions  29
in general. To test the sensitivity of the estimates we may use 3-shift workers 
as a control group and estimate a model analogous to equation (19) with sepa-
rate intercept for all shift forms and separate industry-year dummies for day-
time workers and shift workers. Results from regressions using this specifica-
tion are shown in the bottom row of Table 4. The effect of the working time re-
duction as measured relative to 3-shift workers (-0.72) is stronger than the ef-
fect relative to daytime workers (-0.51) when studying total earnings. However, 
when shift compensation has been excluded from wages we get an estimate (-
0.34) very close to the effect relative to daytime workers (-0.35). 
As explained in Section 4.1, it is conceivable that other workers in firms that 
employ 2-shift workers demanded compensation for the improvements for the 
2-shift workers. We found little or no evidence for compensation in terms of 
hours in Section 4.1. If the compensation was in the form of increased wages it 
would imply wages for 2-shift workers rising less relative to other workers than 
if the other workers had been truly unaffected and thus give the wage elasticity 
a positive bias. 
 
Table 5. Elasticities of hourly earnings with respect to standard hours 
Control group  Estimated  





-0.316  -0.346  -0.322  Standard hours 
(0.011)  (0.011)  (0.011) 





(0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0005) 
-0.285  -0.340  -0.282  3-shift  
workers  Standard hours 
(0.012)  (0.013)  (0.012) 
Note: Dependent variable is hourly earnings excluding the shift premium. The middle column is a replication 
from table 4. All regressions include individual specific fixed effects and an age cube. Standard hours are in 
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Table 5 shows estimates of the effects on earnings (minus shift compensa-
tion) when the control variables are varied. The first column only controls for 
time effects. The second column is a replication from Table 4 controlling for 
industry and year interactions. The third column controls for the interaction of 
year, industry, municipality, size of the firm and size of the work place. If the 
control groups were contaminated we should see differences between the mod-
els. The estimates for standard hours should be closer to zero the more controls 
are included since wages for 2-shift workers should have risen more relative to 
the average daytime worker than relative to daytime workers in the same com-
pany. The earnings estimates do not show any systematic differences between 
models, neither relative to daytime workers nor relative to 3 -shift workers, 
suggesting once again that contamination should not be a major concern. 
 
5.2  Hourly wages and the actual working time reduction 
Section 4.2 showed that the 2-shift workers that experienced reduced scheduled 
hours also experienced a corresponding reduction in actual hours. This section 
will use the reported scheduled weekly hours to deduce how hourly earnings 
changed for 2-shift workers receiving an actual working time reduction com-
pared to workers not receiving it. The regressions will use scheduled weekly 
hours as an explanatory variable along with standard hours (capturing the effect 
on the average 2-shift worker).  
We can only use observations with reported scheduled weekly hours. The 
lower panel in Table 6 shows that the effect of the standard hours reduction on 
hourly earnings when estimated on observations with reported scheduled hours 
(-0.21) is somewhat smaller than the effect estimated on all observations (-0.35) 
displayed in table 5. This discrepancy imply that the impact of the working 
time reduction on workers with reported scheduled hours differs somewhat 
from the impact on workers without reported scheduled hours. Nevertheless, 
this section will use workers with reported scheduled hours to study heteroge-
neity among 2-shift workers in the effects of the reform on hourly earnings. 
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Table 6. Differences in the wage response between 2-shift workers 
Estimated parameter  Base sample  Restricted sample 
-0.154  -0.181  Scheduled hours  (0.011)  (0.033) 
-0.155  -0.141  Standard hours  (0.018)  (0.022) 
0.0018  -0.0006  2-shift dummy  (0.0009)  (0.0009) 
-0.208  -0.207  Standard hours (for observations 
with reported scheduled hours)  (0.017)  (0.018) 
0.0027  -0.0004  2-shift dummy  (0.0009)  (0.0009) 
Note: Dependent variable is hourly earnings excluding the shift premium. All regressions include individual 
specific fixed effects, year and industry interaction dummies and an age cube. Standard errors are in paren-
theses. Restricted sample only includes workers with scheduled hours equal to standard hours or 40 hours. 
 
Two different samples are used, one that includes all workers with more 
than 30 scheduled hours per week, and one where only workers with scheduled 
hours equal to standard hours, or equal to 40 are included. The first sample al-
lows for wage differences depending on scheduled hours for all workers. The 
second sample isolates the wage effect for 2-shift workers that had their sched-
uled hours reduced to 38 compared to the 2 -shift workers whose hours r e-
mained at 40. 
The elasticity with respect to scheduled hours is negative (in the order of –
0.15), for both samples. This suggests that hourly wages rose for all 2-shift 
workers, but that the effect was strongest for the workers that saw a decrease in 
scheduled hours and thus also in actual hours.  
Some caution is warranted when interpreting this result since differences in 
the implementation between observation can be endogenous to the wage effect. 
The result does however lend some further support to the finding in Section 5.1 
that a working time reduction increases, rather than decreases, wage pressure. IFAU – The effects of working time reductions   32
6  Conclusions 
This paper has shown that a general working time reduction may affect equilib-
rium unemployment through the wage setting process even if the equilibrium 
unemployment rate is independent of the state of technology. This implies that 
the response of hourly wages to a partial working time reduction contains evi-
dence on the response of equilibrium unemployment to a general working time 
reduction, i.e. whether work sharing is feasible. 
The empirical part of the paper studies the effects on actual hours and 
hourly wages of a reduction in standard hours as defined by central agreements. 
The results show that the effect of the working time reduction was much 
smaller than intended. On average the reduction is estimated to have only 40 % 
of the intended effect. Furthermore, the results show that the scheduled weekly 
hours remained unchanged for many workers. This indicates that far from all 
workers who were supposed to receive the reduction according to the central 
agreement actually received it, suggesting that flexible agreements may not be 
a good way to reduce actual working hours. It also suggests a potential bias in 
earlier studies that focused on the effects of self reported standard hours on ac-
tual hours.  
Hourly wages for 2-shift workers did rise as a result of the working time re-
duction. Wages increased relative to both daytime workers and other shift 
workers. The wage increase was sufficient to keep monthly earnings constant 
relative to other workers. Workers receiving a reduction in scheduled hours, 
and hence also a larger reduction in actual hours, experienced a larger wage in-
crease than other 2-shift workers. Thus, wages rose for all 2-shift workers and 
more for workers receiving a larger actual reduction. This is taken as evidence 
of an increase, rather than a decrease, in wage pressure as a result of the work-
ing time reduction.  
Thus, the paper does not find any empirical support for the hypothesis that 
work sharing is possible through wage restraint. If the raise in wage pressure 
from the partial working time reduction was due to fixed costs, the theoretical 
model predicts that equilibrium unemployment may in fact increase in the re-
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Appendix A. The data set 
Table A1 show the variables used in the paper. Straight-time wages and hours 
include piece rate and time rate hours and wages. The size variables are cate-
gorical, taking 9 different values for the size of the firm and 10 values for the 
size of the workplace. A workplace is defined as workers covered by the same 
agreement within the same firm. 
 
Tabell A1. Variables in the data set 
Variables 
Source 







Fixed effect  
indicator 





Size of work 
place  Age 
Shift form  Shift  
compensation    Gender 
  Total earnings     
SAF 
  Monthly salary     
Central agreements  Standard hours 
by shift form       
 
Table A2 shows some descriptive statistics for variables used in the regres-
sions. Only very obvious outliers
22 has been removed from the sample used for 
                                                 
22 The main restrictions are the exclusion of workers younger than 18 or older than 65, or work-
ing zero or more than 600 straight-time hours or 200 overtime hours during the quarter. Observa-
tions with nominal hourly earnings are below 20 SEK and above 100 SEK in 1981 are dropped. 
These numbers are increased by 7.5 % (the estimated time trend in the sample) each year. The 
number of observation dropped by this procedure is very small. IFAU – The effects of working time reductions  37
this table. It can be noted that 55 % of observations had their scheduled hours 
reported. 
 
Table A2. Descriptive statistics for daytime and 2-shift workers in manufactur-
ing  
  Day and 2-shift  Day  2-Shift 
  1981-92  1981-82  1983-88  1989-92  1989-92 
Number of Observations  4,365,826    775,170  2,242,689  1,100,078    247,889 
Number of individuals    929,278    446,767     672,800    438,629    114,754 
Fraction Male  0.76  0.76  0.76  0.76  0.76 
37.2  38.1  37.1     37.6     34.6  Age  (13.1)  (13.4)  (13.1)  (12.9)  (12.0) 
Standard Hours  (38-40)*  40  (38,5-40)*  40  38 
Fraction reported scheduled hours  0.55  0.51  0.58  0.51  0.61 
Fraction scheduled hours >30   0.51  0.47  0.54  0.46  0.59 
39.8  39.9  39.8  39.8  39.0  Scheduled hours if >30  (1.35)  (1.16)  (1.23)  (1.65)  (1.36) 
374.8  370.9  376.7  375.3  367.7      Quarterly actual hours (including 
overtime)  (134.4)  (126.9)  (134.9)  (138.3)  (134.8) 
9.9  6.4  10.3  10.7  13.7  Average overtime (OT) per quarter 
(18.7)  (15.1)  (18.8)  (19.8)  (21.1) 
Fraction OT>0  0.51  0.37  0.53  0.52  0.65 
19.6  17.0  19.5  20.6  21.2   Average OT per quarter if OT>0  (22.4)  (20.8)  (22.2)  (23.5)  (23.0) 
20,712  13,964  18,962   27,062   29,467  Quarterly earnings  (21,537)  (5,194)  (27,813)  (10,863)  (11,699) 
55.2  37.6  50.2  72.2   80.3  Hourly earnings 
(47.9)  (12.2)  (62.1)  (19.1)  (18.5) 
53.7  36.8  48.9   71.2  72.7   Hourly earnings minus shift com-
pensation  (47.4)  (7.98)  (61.9)  (18.7)  (16.1) 
54.4  37.3  49.4  71.1  78.7  Straight-time hourly wage 
(47.8)  (12.2)  (62.1)  (19.1)  (18.6) 
349.2  145.7  330.1   456.8  680.7   Average OT-premium 
(767.6)  (406.2)  (686.7)  (937.7)  (1182) 
33.0  21.3  30.1  40.5  48.2  Hourly OT-premium if OT>0  (29.7)  (25.1)  (28.4)  (29.7)  (33.3) 
0.024  0.019  0.024  0.012  0.095 
Shift compensation share (SCS)  (0.051)  (0.045)  (0.051)  (0.041)  (0.059) 
Fraction SCS>7 %  0.152  0.117  0.154  0.058  0.667 
Note: Day and 2-shift workers can only be separated from 1988. Standard errors are in parenthe-
ses. 
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Some further restrictions have been applied on the data set used in the re-
gressions. Only workers aged 25-55 during the full sample period are included 
to avoid problems with different age effects between shift forms. For individu-
als with multiple observations in one year only the observation that had the 
highest number of hours is used. Dropping these individuals or stacking hours 
and earnings on the observation with the highest number of hours (for industry 
etc.) did not change the results. Workers with less than 320 straight-time hours 
are excluded from the sample to avoid problems with variations in the number 
of weeks worked (given that data is quarterly). To reduce the number of indus-
try dummies industries that employed less than ten 2-shift workers after the re-
duction are dropped, as well as industries with less than 100 observations in to-
tal. Individuals observed only before or after the reduction are dropped. Table 
A3 shows the number of observations dropped at each stage in this procedure. 
Only the observations from before (1981-82) and after (1989-92) the reduction 
has been included in the table since the regressions only uses observations for 
these years. IFAU – The effects of working time reductions  39
 
Table A3. Number of observations remaining after applying restrictions on the 
sample 
  1989-92  1981-82 and 1989-92 
  Day  2-shift 
Day and 2-
shift 
3-shift  Total 
Manufacturing  1,100,078    247,889  2,123,137    204,962  2,328,099 
Prime aged    451,619     92,537    902,885     92,845    995,730 
Highest number of 
hours/year and individual    446,433     91,214    891,755     90,289    982,044 
More than 320 hours 
worked in the 2
nd quarter    347,411     71,518    690,232     71,384    761,616 
Large agreements    332,726     71,437    645,462     66,736    712,198 
Observations in both peri-
ods    195,601     41,092    375,317     50,604    425,921 
Reported scheduled hours 
>30     74,663     15,172    141,305     19,433    160,738 
Note: The two bottom rows describes the number of observations in the data sets used in the pa-
per. The data set that only contains observations with reported scheduled hours has been con-
structed by first dropping observations without (or with less than 30) reported scheduled hours 
and than applying the other restrictions. IFAU – The effects of working time reductions   40
Appendix B. Identification of 2-shift 
workers 
Daytime workers and 2-shift workers where not separated in the data set before 
1988 (but the two types of 3-shift workers can be identified). This is not a prob-
lem for standard hours since standard hours where the same (40 hours per 
week) for both daytime and 2 -shift workers in 1981 and 1982 (the only two 
years before 1989 that will be used in the regressions).  
Problems will arise if there were differences in actual hours and wages be-
tween shift forms before the reduction. The individual fixed effects would 
however remove this problem if workers did not change their shift form at all 
between the two time periods (see Section 4.1). But if this problem remains af-
ter removing the fixed effects, it will bias the estimates of the effect of the 
working time reduction. 
The solution will be to construct a proxy for the shift form of the worker. 
The proxy will be constructed by using the share of earnings coming from shift 
compensation. This share will be referred to as the Shift compensation share 
(SCS). This proxy will contain errors since the shift compensation variable also 
contains daytime workers unsociable hours’ premium. The accuracy of the 
proxy can be evaluated for the years 1988-92 when the true definition is avail-
able. 
There are two possible misclassification problems in the construction of the 
proxy. First, some of the workers classified as 2-shift workers are actually day-
time workers. Second, some of the workers classified as daytime workers are 
actually 2-shift workers.  
A 7 % cut-off level of the SCS (all workers with a SCS over 7 % are classi-
fied as 2-shift workers) will deliver a (local) minimum of the fraction of day-
time workers classified as 2 -shift workers. There is a monotonic relationship 
between the cut-off level and the number of 2 -shift workers misclassified as 
daytime workers, but this kind of error is a minor problem. Table B1 displays 
the extent of measurement errors during 1989-92; the years used to evaluate the 
procedure can be evaluated.  
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Table B1. Classification errors 
SCS-proxy 
 
Day (85.3 %)  2-shift (14.7 %) 
Day (82.6 %)  79.8   2.8 
SAF 
2-shift (17.4 %)   5.5  11.9 
Percent errors   6.4  19.2 
Note: Results from the 1989-92 data set used to define manufacturing and mining workers as 2-
shift workers if they have a shift compensation share (SCS) of more than 7 %. SAF definitions 
refer to the original definitions in the data set. 
 
One potential problem with the classification procedure is that the percent-
age of misclassifications may change over time. An estimated linear trend for 
the SCS of the 20
th percentile
23 of 3-shift workers show only weak signs of a 
trend for these workers, the SCS increases by 0.2 percentage points each year.
24 
The estimated trend for 3-shift workers could in principle be fitted on the cut-
off level for 2-shift workers. This will not be done since the trend is small, and 
there are no signs of a trend for the 20
th percentile of 2-shift workers between 
1988 and 1992. 
The expected attenuation bias (due to measurement errors) of the estimate 
of the initial difference between daytime and 2-shift workers ( b ˆ ) is, in the ab-





+ - = TRUE . The parameters n 
and h denotes the fractions of workers erroneously classified as 2-shift workers 
and daytime workers. By using the numbers in Table B1 we get  192 . 0 = n and 
064 . 0 = h . Thus, one would expect the estimates using the true definition to be 
1.3 times the estimate based on the proxy if the 2-shift variable is uncorrelated 
with other covariates. In principle it is possible to correct for this bias (see 
Aigner 1973) but the double fixed effects (individuals and industry-years) 
model makes the implementation difficult. 
While noting that the estimates of the initial difference between shift forms 
will be biased to zero it is still a reasonably good proxy and we may study how 
                                                 
23 Used since 20 % of two shift workers where misclassified as daytime workers. 
24 It has a minimum of 11.7 % in 1980 and a maximum of 14.4 % in 1991. IFAU – The effects of working time reductions   42
the estimates of the effect of the reduction changes if this proxy is included. 
The measurement errors will not bias the estimates of the effect of the standard 
hours’ reduction if the inclusion of the proxy does not affect the estimates of 
interest (measurement errors in a variable that in itself does not affect the rele-
vant estimate will not be a problem). 
 